Blog · Batch 06

Sentiment Landscape Exploration on Social Media During the Thailand–Cambodia Tension #6 (4–20 Aug 2025)

Published on October 12, 2025
Authors Abhidech Tepin and Krongkan Karanet

Sentiment Landscape Exploration on Social Media During the Thailand–Cambodia Tension (Batch #6) covers data collected between 4 - 20 August 2025, comprising a total of 85,626 relevant posts on the platform X. Online discussion during this period coincided with the de-escalation of armed clashes and the shift toward diplomatic measures through the General Border Committee (GBC) and the Regional Border Committee (RBC) meetings.

Message Over Time

Key Events During the Data Collection Period

1. 4 Aug.
   • Secretariat-level talks between Thailand and Cambodia opened in Malaysia, running from 4 to 6 August in preparation for the Extraordinary General Border Committee (GBC) Meeting.
   • The decomposing remains of Cambodian soldiers were found along the border, raising public health concerns among Thai troops and communities in the area. Thailand called on Cambodia to recover the remains.
   • False information linked to Hun Sen, President of the Cambodian Senate, circulated online.
2. 7 Aug.
   • The Extraordinary GBC Meeting adopted a 13-point ceasefire agreement, requiring a Regional Border Committee (RBC) meeting within two weeks and a further GBC meeting within one month, or an extraordinary session, to monitor implementation of the ceasefire.
3. 8 Aug.
   • The Ad Hoc Centre for Thailand–Cambodia Border Situation appointed Panadda Wongphudee as a volunteer spokesperson, tasked with clarifying facts and countering information issued by the spokeswoman of Cambodia's Ministry of National Defence through online channels.
4. 9 Aug.
   • Three personnel of Infantry Company 111 stepped on a landmine while patrolling the Chong Don Ao – Krisana area in Kantharalak district, Si Sa Ket Province.
5. 12 Aug.
   • A Thai soldier was seriously wounded by a landmine while patrolling the Chong Chup Tamok area near the Ta Moan Thom temple in Surin Province.
   • Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement of condemnation and lodged formal protests with Cambodia, the President of the Ottawa Convention and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following the fourth incident in which a Thai ranger stepped on a newly laid anti-personnel mine. Thailand characterised the incident as a grave violation of international law and of Cambodia's treaty obligations.
6. 14-15 Aug.
   • Maris Sangiampongsa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, held trilateral talks with his Chinese and Cambodian counterparts. China expressed support for implementation of the ceasefire agreement, for peaceful negotiation, and for ASEAN's role in the process.
   • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefed diplomats from ASEAN member states and from states parties to the Ottawa Convention, together with representatives of international organisations, setting out the facts of Cambodia's violations of the Ottawa Convention and of the ceasefire agreement.
   • General Thongchai Rodyoi, Chief of Staff of the Royal Thai Army, and Dr Andrew Byers, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, discussed the border situation. Thailand raised concerns over landmines, drone incursions and disinformation. The United States supported resolving the dispute through ASEAN frameworks rather than through the United Nations, and offered assistance to the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT).
7. 16 Aug.
   • The Minister of Foreign Affairs led a delegation of representatives from 33 countries to Si Sa Ket Province to receive briefings and observe evidence presented by Thailand concerning landmines and the effects of the attacks. Thailand reiterated that Cambodia had violated the Ottawa Convention and Thai sovereignty.
   • Thailand and Cambodia convened an Extraordinary RBC Meeting in Khlong Yai district, Trat Province, and signed a memorandum giving effect to the 13-point agreement reached at the GBC. Thailand proposed the addition of humanitarian demining and the suppression of scam call-centre networks, to which Cambodia had not yet responded.
8. 18 Aug.
   • Cambodia requested that the RBC meeting with Thailand's Second Army Area be postponed from 21 to 27 August, citing the need for additional preparation.
   • Rumours circulated that Thai troops had dismantled barbed-wire fencing. The government denied the reports and reaffirmed that fencing would be reinforced only within Thai sovereign territory.
   • Allegations arose concerning Ban Nong Chan in Sa Kaeo Province, an area that had formerly served as a temporary shelter for Cambodian refugees. Thailand stated that the Cambodian community had expanded into Thai territory in violation of the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU2000), despite repeated Thai protests.
   • Cambodian nationals gathered to demand the removal of the barbed-wire fencing, chanting "Don't Thai to me" and accusing Thailand of encroaching on Cambodian territory. The incident attracted considerable attention online.
9. 19 Aug.
   • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on Ban Nong Chan affirming that the area lies within Thai territory, stating that Thailand had exercised restraint over many years while Cambodia had used its own population to encroach on Thai territory in bad faith.
   • Thai troops escorted the ASEAN Interim Observer Team to the Chong An Ma area in Ubon Ratchathani Province to receive information on ceasefire violations and evidence concerning landmines presented by Thailand. Cambodian soldiers attempted to obstruct the observation before the situation was resolved without violent confrontation.
   • The Humanitarian Mine Action Unit of the Royal Thai Navy recovered a mobile phone near Phu Makhua. Thailand stated that the device contained evidence linking Cambodian soldiers to the use of PMN-2 anti-personnel mines.
10. 20 Aug.
    • Jirayu Huangsap, Government Spokesman and a member of the Ad Hoc Centre for Thailand–Cambodia Border Situation, stated that Ban Nong Chan in Sa Kaeo Province lies entirely within Thai territory. Thailand had previously allowed Cambodians to take temporary refuge in the area from the effects of war, but the settlement subsequently expanded and encroached on Thai sovereign territory in violation of the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU2000), which Thailand has consistently opposed.

This was the final round of data collection. Monitoring found that although online activity remained high, conditions along the border were relatively calm in the early part of the period. Daily reports issued by the Ad Hoc Centre for Thailand–Cambodia Border Situation recorded the situation as normal each day, with no significant clashes. This calm on the ground contrasted sharply with what was taking place online, where the conflict had shifted from armed confrontation to a full-scale contest of information, rumour and disinformation. Discussion online was filled with unverified claims, both about conditions in the border area and about the domestic politics of the two governments following the General Border Committee (GBC) meeting, at which a 13-point joint agreement was signed.

4 August was the opening day of the GBC talks in Malaysia. Although the negotiations were seen as a significant step forward, online discussion was instead dominated by reports that decomposing bodies of Cambodian soldiers had been found along the border, which raised humanitarian concerns. At the same time, false information circulated alleging that Hun Sen had played a part in attempting to derail the ceasefire agreement. When the GBC announced the 13-point agreement on 7 August, online narratives split along two lines. Some treated it as progress toward peace, while others expressed distrust of the cooperation and pointed to the possibility that the ceasefire would be violated.

Online tension intensified again on 12 August after a Thai soldier was wounded by a landmine near the Ta Moan Thom temple. Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Cambodia's use of landmines for the fourth time and lodged protests with the President of the Ottawa Convention and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The incident prompted debate over international law and humanitarian concerns. The volume of online conversation rose again on 15 August, as major powers began to take a visible role. Thailand held a briefing for diplomats from states parties to the Ottawa Convention and reiterated that Cambodia had violated the treaty, while China issued a statement supporting reconciliation efforts and the United States called for a stronger ASEAN role. Debate over sovereignty and treaty obligations on 16 August went viral, recording the highest engagement per post of the period.

On 18 August, local grievances resurfaced when Cambodia requested a postponement of the Regional Border Committee (RBC) meeting with Thailand's Second Army Area. Rumours circulated online that Thai troops had removed barbed-wire fencing from the border area, which the Thai government denied, reaffirming that it had only reinforced positions within its own sovereign territory. At the same time, Cambodian villagers staged a protest at Ban Nong Chan in Sa Kaeo Province demanding the removal of the fencing, invoking memories of the former refugee camp. On 19 August, the Thai military escorted the ASEAN Interim Observer Team to the border area to examine further evidence of landmines, but the team was obstructed by Cambodian soldiers at Chong An Ma, while the Thai side opted to de-escalate. The Humanitarian Mine Action Unit of the Royal Thai Navy also reported finding a mobile phone and evidence of Cambodian use of PMN-2 mines near Phu Makhua, which brought online debate over treaty violations and military transparency back to the fore.

By 20 August, the volume of online communication remained high, although public attention had begun to decline. Online narratives had shifted away from direct clashes toward broader concerns, including the risks posed by landmines, humanitarian issues, the credibility of ASEAN mechanisms, and the role of major powers in shaping the direction of the conflict.

This round of monitoring found that the contest over information had become a component of the Thailand–Cambodia tensions no less significant than military confrontation. By 20 August, online narratives revealed persistent public distrust, the spread of rumour and disinformation, and the fragility of confidence in diplomatic agreements. These dynamics underline the dual role of social media as both an early warning signal of potential flashpoints for violence and a catalyst capable of sustaining public tension even when the battlefield itself is quiet. For mediators and policymakers, recognising and understanding this digital dimension is therefore essential to designing approaches to de-escalation and to building sustainable regional stability.

Analysis of the Batch 6 data identified 7 main narrative themes, set out below.

Emerged Topics

Discussion of peace-oriented approaches increased on social media, though still surrounded by distrust and fear, driven by political bargaining, competing claims over sovereignty, and efforts to restore bilateral relations through peace mechanisms. Understanding these dynamics is essential for developing digital peacebuilding approaches aimed at reducing informational conflict and building long-term trust between the two societies. The details of each topic are as follows.

The topic of Peacebuilding became especially prominent following the General Border Committee (GBC) meeting. Discussion centered on the use of peaceful and diplomatic approaches over military ones. Popular hashtags such as #CeaseFire and #CrimesAgainstHumanity were used to call on both sides to end the violence and honor the ceasefire agreement. Negotiations were viewed as a positive signal, though accompanied by skepticism over the sincerity of both countries' leaders, a recurring theme within the online space during this period.

Next was the topic of Situation Updates, consisting of factual reporting on the GBC and Regional Border Committee (RBC) meetings, as well as security-related news such as the reinforcement of barbed-wire fencing, landmine clearance operations, and observation by ASEAN representatives. This content generally maintained a neutral tone, though it carried an undertone of concern over the transparency of the international process.

The topic of Alleging that Cambodia attacked civilians reflected persistent deep-seated distrust. Many users accused Cambodia of initiating the attacks and violating the ceasefire agreement, particularly regarding the use of landmines in the area surrounding Prasat Ta Muen Thom, which was viewed as a violation of the Ottawa Convention. Commentary within this category tended to carry angry, accusatory language, reflecting the rapid construction and spread of a "perpetrator" narrative across other media as well.

The topic of Domestic Politics re-emerged prominently during this period, as the border conflict became closely intertwined with domestic politics, particularly through the mobilization of nationalist groups and opposition figures calling for the cancellation of the 2000 and 2001 Memoranda of Understanding on the Survey and Demarcation of the Land Boundary, commonly known as "MOU43" and "MOU44," which critics characterized as "shackles" binding Thailand to a position of disadvantage. Meanwhile, the government, led by the Pheu Thai Party, defended these agreements as among the few remaining peace mechanisms still anchoring both countries to negotiation. This period also saw a significant domestic political development, the Constitutional Court's ruling on the ethics case against Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, which was widely invoked online to broaden criticism of her leadership and the government's legitimacy.

The topic of Life and Humanity followed, focused on the impact on people's lives in the border area, such as labor issues, cross-border trade, and the local economy. Discussion within this category reflected a more human-centered perspective.

The topic of General News consisted of general conversation not directly related to the border, such as the 20-baht flat-rate electric train policy, Thailand-U.S. reciprocal tariff negotiations, and celebrity or entertainment news, reflecting a degree of public relief following the peak of tensions in July.

Finally, the topic of Patriotic and Heroic Mobilization, though the smallest in share, remained a space for expressing support for soldiers and those affected, along with pride in national identity, though with markedly less intense nationalist language compared to the previous period.

Overall, the topics appearing between August 4-20, 2025 show that the Thailand-Cambodia conflict had shifted into an arena of contestation over meaning. Discussions of peace, accusations, claims over sovereignty, and domestic political debate all reflected how the violence had not disappeared, but had instead transformed into a struggle over narrative space, contesting what counted as truth and who was the "wrongdoer." The rise of the Peacebuilding topic did not necessarily signal a genuine easing of public sentiment, but rather a shift toward using the "language of peace" to compete for political and international legitimacy. At the same time, the interplay between Domestic Politics and the Alleging that Cambodia attacked civilians topic pointed to how nationalist sentiment and domestic political strategy converged, using the external conflict as a tool to stir national feeling. The analysis of this period thus reveals that the conflict was no longer driven by weapons, but by "narratives" with equal power to build or undermine peace, and this is precisely what modern peace mechanisms must come to understand: that emotion, fear, and digital narrative have become the new frontline of regional security.

Sentiment Distribution

Sentiment analysis for the period August 4-20, 2025 shows a transition from anger centered on the physical clashes and combat itself toward feelings of distrust expressed through nationalist narratives and diplomatic processes, a new form of tension now playing out primarily on the informational battlefield rather than along the actual border. The findings show Negative sentiment remained high at 49.21%, while Neutral stood at 44.61% and Positive at just 6.18%, reinforcing that distrust, anger, and dissatisfaction toward the border situation continued to drive online communication, even as actual clashes declined significantly.

Negative sentiment was largely tied to accusations that Cambodia had violated the ceasefire agreement, the use of landmines in border areas, and dissatisfaction with the Thai government, which was perceived by some as weak or overly conciliatory in negotiations. Many posts reflected anger framed around defending national sovereignty and dignity, often escalating into sarcastic, mocking tones or language bordering on hate speech.

Neutral sentiment appeared in posts reporting information, facts, or summaries of the GBC and RBC meetings without expressing strong personal opinion, reflecting a degree of caution among users who preferred to monitor the situation rather than actively shape public opinion.

Positive sentiment, though limited in share, was largely tied to posts expressing hope for the peace process, encouragement for personnel on the ground, or support for a diplomacy-led approach. However, this positive sentiment still emerged amid ongoing uncertainty and fear of renewed clashes.

Sentiment Distribution by Topic

Analyzing sentiment alongside the emerged topics for the period August 4-20, 2025 shows that the emotional tenor of online communication varied considerably and correlated closely with the nature of each topic, particularly between content related to security and politics, which tended to be dominated by negative sentiment.

The topic of Alleging that Cambodia attacked civilians recorded the highest share of Negative sentiment at 84.60%, reflecting persistent anger, distrust, and a view of the opposing side as an enemy or violator. Accusations that Cambodia had breached the ceasefire agreement or used landmines remained the central issue driving ongoing tension. These posts typically reflected the view among users that violence originated from the other side and warranted a firmer response.

Life and Humanity and Domestic Politics showed similar levels of negative sentiment (53.67% and 51.90% respectively). Within Life and Humanity, negativity centered particularly on cross-border labor issues and the local economy in areas affected by political uncertainty. Within Domestic Politics, anger and disappointment were directed at both the government and the opposition, both of which were seen as leveraging the border conflict for political purposes. The Neutral and Positive shares within these two topics also reflected efforts by some groups to redirect attention toward public welfare rather than political conflict.

Peacebuilding and Situation Updates showed similar patterns, both led by Neutral sentiment (52.79% and 54.64% respectively), reflecting spaces dominated by news reporting, references to official statements, and information-driven communication. Even so, Negative sentiment in both categories remained above 40%, indicating that distrust toward the peace process and negotiations had not genuinely subsided.

General News, by contrast, showed a markedly different emotional balance, with Positive sentiment reaching 26.49%, largely driven by general news or domestic policy content, such as the 20-baht flat-rate electric train scheme or entertainment news. This type of content helped ease the overall intensity of emotional conflict within the online space.

Conversely, Patriotic and Heroic Mobilization, despite its small overall share, recorded the second-highest Positive sentiment (20.75%) and the lowest Negative sentiment (8.04%). Content within this category mostly consisted of encouragement for soldiers, support for those affected, and an emphasis on community solidarity in the affected areas, reflecting a sense of pride and national unity in the face of crisis.

In summary, although peace-related content began to gain more space, negative sentiment continued to exert strong influence, particularly within topics tied to security and politics. Creating open spaces for dialogue therefore remains a key condition for easing public sentiment and building trust in the digital peace process.

Hate Speech Distribution

The hate speech analysis shows that the intensity of hatred within online conversation persisted, even as the situation moved into a phase of diplomacy-led measures through the General Border Committee (GBC) and Regional Border Committee (RBC) meetings, and following the formal signing of the ceasefire agreement on August 7, 2025. The overall share of hate speech returned to levels similar to those seen before the armed clashes. Type 1 accounted for the largest share at 65.05% of all negative posts, indicating a return to everyday expressions of hatred, such as insults like "โง่" (stupid) or "ปั้นเรื่องโกย" (fabricating lies), driven by anger and unresolved dissatisfaction between the two sides. Within the Thai political context, the conflict was also used as a tool to attack the government, expressing discontent with its handling of the situation and negotiations, with accusations that the government had "betrayed the nation" or was "weak."

Type 3, characterized by ethnic stereotyping, stigmatization, and dehumanization, followed at 28.24%, reflecting deep-seated prejudice between the two nations. Examples included terms such as "เนรคุณ" (ungrateful) and "ไร้ยางอาย" (shameless), along with accusations of being "deceptive," "violating agreements," "inhumane," and "insincere" toward peace restoration efforts.

Type 4 and Type 5 appeared at 4.09% and 1.00% respectively, reflecting a decline in calls for discrimination, though direct calls for and endorsement of violence persisted. Type 2 appeared at 1.62%, a slight increase from the previous period, likely linked to rumors of "spies" or "traitors" and attempts to expose the personal information of individuals suspected of being such.

In summary, the pattern of hate speech during this period shows that online hostility did not decline in step with the de-escalation of the real-world conflict. Instead, it persisted as a residual social sentiment, accompanied by narratives reflecting deep-seated prejudice. This ongoing hostility poses long-term risks to the peacebuilding process and erodes public confidence in resolving the conflict through non-violent means.

You can view the interactive dashboard at neomomentum.co/c-map